




William G. Weissert and Cynthia Matthews Cready
Estimates of hospital-to-nursing home placement delays have always been varied,
and given Medicare's new Prospective Payment System (PPS) based on diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs), they are likely to have changed again. Theory andprevious
research suggest that four patient characteristics are the main causes of delays:
Medicaid as the patient's nursing home payer source; need for heavy care due to
major physical or mental problems; admission to the hospitalfrom a nursing home;
and lack of social support. A pilot study of all 1,016 elderly awaiting nursing
home placement in two admission cohorts (pre- and post-PPS) from the three
largest hospitals in the county surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina -where
nursing home beds are in short supply -indicates that other factors are more
important. While most placements were delayed, delays were short. Multiple
regression results show that Medicaid patients' delays were only about a day longer
than those ofprivate-pay patients. Ofthe many heavy-care conditions studied, only
three were associated with delay. Patients without social support and patients
admitted from a nursing home, discharged to a hospital-affiliated facility, or
placed after PPS had shorter delays. Long delays werefound among patients who
had applied for Medicaid coverage but had not yet been certified as financially
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eligible. Nonwhites and males were also delayed. Thesefindings, if replicated in
other areas with perceived nursing home bed shortages, appear to have important
implications not only for the usefulness of nursing home case-mix reimbursement
and subacute levels of nursing home care, butfor nursing home bed-need estimates,
too, as well asfor Medicaid eligibility determination practices and civil rights law
enforcement.
Although considerable research embracing a variety of methods has
shown that some patients experience delayed hospital discharge
because they are awaiting nursing home placement, agreement on the
nature of the problem ends there. Magnitude estimates differed widely
before the implementation of Medicare's DRG-based Prospective Pay-
ment System (PPS) for hospital reimbursement. Because financial
incentives under PPS now encourage earlier discharges, the prevalence
and average delay of patients awaiting placement are likely to have
changed.
The hospital industry has focused on the placement delay problem
as evidence of the need for a new hospital-based level of nursing home
care (Kane and Kennie 1984). In addition, some hospital representa-
tives have urged their state legislatures to establish potentially expen-
sive special funds to reimburse hospitals for that portion of elderly
patients' unreimbursed hospital days which the hospitals attribute to a
perceived nursing home bed shortage -particularly a Medicaid nurs-
ing home bed shortage.
A response by some Medicaid agencies has been the development
of case mix-adjusted nursing home reimbursement, explicitly adjust-
ing the amount paid to nursing homes to reflect case-mix complexity.
Ten states now include some type of case-mix adjustment in their
nursing home reimbursement system, and several other stateshave
similar systems under consideration. The systems are predicated on the
assumption that the primary cause of hospital-to-nursing home place-
ment delays is the heavy care requirements of some patients (Scanlon
1980).
A typical state's Medicaid reimbursement system pays a flat per
diem rate or a capped prospective or retrospective rate which does not
adjust for the extra costs of caring for heavy-care patients. Liu and
Palesch (1981) have argued that under such payment systems, even if
the Medicaid payment rate were equal to the private-pay rate,
Medicaid patients requiring heavier than average care would be least
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desired by the nursing home because they would require more than
average care but would generate only average reimbursement.
Weissert, Scanlon, Wan, and Skinner (1983) developed a nursing
home incentive reimbursement system that paid nursing homes the
estimated extra cost of caring for heavy-care patients. While the incen-
tive payment system was found to increase nursing home heavy-care
admissions, evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the payment system
(Meiners, Thorburn, Roddy, and Jones 1985) showed that outlays for
heavy-care incentive payments were not recouped in reduced place-
ment delays. This raised an important question: are heavy-care
patients the ones who are delayed in hospitals while awaiting nursing
home placement?
This article reviews findings from the considerable amount of
research undertaken on hospital discharge delays. It then presents find-
ings from a pilot study of 1,016 hospital-to-nursing home placements,
which examined the influence of a number of variables-including
patient heavy-care characteristics-on the delay problem in Charlotte,
North Carolina, a large southeastern metropolitan area of the United
States. It concludes with implications for public policy, including case-
mix nursing home reimbursement.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
Before the implementation of PPS, Medicare paid hospitals for the
"extra" days spent in the hospital by patients awaiting a nursing home
bed. Two national surveys produced widely differing pre-PPS esti-
mates of the prevalence of such delays, ranging from 1 million to 7
million hospital days per year (American Professional Standards
Review Organizations 1980; U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 1980).
In New York State, three pre-PPS one-day prevalence surveys
showed between 3,000 and 4,000 hospital patients awaiting placement
at a lower level of care each year from 1978 through 1980 (Finger
Lakes Health Systems Agency Back-Up Action Task Force 1982).
More recently, a one-day survey of six Monroe County, New York,
hospitals found 164 patients awaiting placement (Barker, Williams,
Zimmer, et al. 1985). In Massachusetts, a statewide one-day survey of
acute general hospitals showed 1,111 patients awaiting placement, a 28
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percent increase from 1977 (Massachusetts Hospital Association 1979).
The average wait per patient reported was typically a month or more.
Gruenberg and Willemain (1982) have suggested that such cross-
sectional studies overstate the magnitude of the delay problem. Using
data from a 1976 Massachusetts Department of Public Health two-
wave survey, they found that 620 hospital patients were awaiting dis-
charge to a nursing home at the time of the initial survey. About 17
percent had become ready for discharge on that same day. On resur-
vey, six weeks later, they showed a median waiting time of five days.
But for patients already waiting, the median waiting time was 21 days.
More than one-quarter of all delayed patients were placed in nursing
homes within two days after the initial survey. Fewer than 12 percent of
the original population remained in the hospital longer than six weeks.
Other non-cross-sectional studies have reported few placement
delays. From a medical record sample of 218 Medicare- or Medicaid-
covered admissions to a California hospital, a utilization review nurse
coordinator determined that only 26 percent had at least one unneces-
sary hospital day, with an average of about four (Restuccia and Hollo-
way 1976). Fewer than 20 percent of 363 consecutive elderly and
nonelderly admissions to the medical service of a New York hospital
experienced any unnecessary hospital stay (Glass, Mulvihill, Smith, et
al. 1977; Glass and Weiner 1976). The average unnecessary stay was
approximately two days.
Meiners and Coffey (1985) used 1980-1982 patient-level data
from Maryland hospitals and the Weissert and colleagues nursing
home reimbursement experiment in San Diego to examine the role of
long-term care placement in DRG overstays. While the data did not
distinguish between medically necessary and unnecessary overstays,
the authors concluded that the 8 percent of Maryland discharges who
were elderly and discharged to nursing homes represented 20 percent
of all DRG outlier stays. (An outlier is a stay of at least [the lesser of]
20 days or 1.94 standard deviations beyond the anticipated average for
the DRG.) For San Diego, 22 percent of placements to nursing homes
were outlier cases.
In short, studies of the magnitude of the hospital discharge delay
problem have produced widely differing estimates. These estimates
often are biased upward by their cross-sectional nature, and primarily
have been the results of studies limited to the northeastern United
States. Studies that have captured the total stay experience appear to
suggest that unnecessary stays are less frequent and shorter than had
previously been indicated.
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DETERMINANTS OF DISCHARGE DELAYS
Role of Patient Case Mix
Using data from the 1973-1974 National Nursing Home Survey and
the 1973 Master Facility Inventory, Scanlon (1980) modeled the nurs-
ing home market and concluded that excess demand existed for nurs-
ing home beds, a finding of importance to the placement delay issue.
He showed that beds available was a significant factor in explaining
nursing home use among all patients, but not among private-pay
patients alone. This suggests that overall nursing home utilization was
constrained by bed availability, but that for private-pay patients a bed
was made available on demand. He also showed that state Medicaid
eligibility policy variations were not significant in explaining total or
private utilization. This he interpreted as further evidence of excess
Medicaid demand. That is, if Medicaid eligibility were expanded,
utilization would be likely to increase, unless too few beds were avail-
able to meet the increased demand. He concluded that nursing homes
would choose private-pay patients over Medicaid patients, and light-
care over heavy-care Medicaid patients.
Empirical evidence that patient heavy-care conditions or
Medicaid coverage are in fact the principal cause of hospital-to-nursing
home placement delays is limited, however. Among the studies
reviewed for this article few actually used data on specific patients. Of
these, a number found various patient heavy-care characteristics to be
associated with placement delays (Finger Lakes Health Systems
Agency Back-Up Action Task Force 1982; Massachusetts Hospital
Association 1979; Gruenberg and Willemain 1982; Glass, Mulvihill,
Smith, et al. 1977; Glass and Weiner 1976; Meiners and Coffey 1985;
Fields, MacKenzie, Charlson, and Sax 1986; Sloane, Redding, and
Wittlin 1981; Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare 1980;
Beattie and Jordan 1975). The Massachusetts Hospital Association
(1979) concluded that heavy-care patients were experiencing delays
because nursing home operators faced a seller's market and could pick
and choose whom they admitted-choosing not to admit Medicaid or
heavy-care patients. But the same state's Medicaid agency concluded
that patient characteristics played a minor role in placement delays
compared to inadequate placement efforts by hospital staff, and other
factors (Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare 1980).
In Gruenberg and Willemain's (1982) study of Massachusetts hos-
pital patients in 1976, fewer than 15 percent of patients awaiting nurs-
ing home placement were considered by the authors to be hard to place
due to heavy-care characteristics. This same group of patients also had
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been admitted to the hospital from a nursing home and were expected
to be covered by Medicaid for their ensuing nursing home stay. While
that made them Medicaid eligible in most cases, it is likely that had the
study been conducted at a later time, the patients would have been
guaranteed a nursing home bed under a Medicaid bed-hold or hospi-
tal-nursing home transfer agreement, devices now used by most
Medicaid programs and hospitals to guarantee nursing home read-
mission.
Findings of more recent studies (Finger Lakes Health Systems
Agency Back-Up Action Task Force 1982; Barker, Williams, Zimmer,
et al. 1985; Glass, Mulvihill, Smith, et al. 1977; Glass and Weiner
1976; Meiners and Coffey 1985) have indicated that patients admitted
from nursing homes to hospitals are less likely to be delayed at dis-
charge and are likely to have shorter-than-average delays.
Gruenberg and Willemain (1982) concluded that the largest group
of patients who had difficulty finding a nursing home bed were
Medicaid patients from the community seeking a permanent stay. How-
ever, the authors' analysis of payment-source effects was complicated
by the lumping together of two important groups of patients heretofore
considered equivalent but now understood to be quite different: those
who were actually Medicaid eligible versus those who had only applied
for Medicaid eligibility but had not yet been verified as eligible. In Gruenberg
and Willemain's study, as in other studies using patient-level data
(Massachusetts Hospital Association 1979; Massachusetts Department
of Public Welfare 1980; Beattie and Jordan 1975), many "Medicaid"
patients actually may have been "Medicaid-pending" patients.
To the nursing home operator this distinction is critical. Medicaid
eligibles have a guaranteed source of payment - albeit low- while
patients whose eligibility is pending represent quite the reverse: they
are poor, but have no guarantee that they will pass the Byzantine
eligibility screens set up by federal, state, and county Medicaid eligibil-
ity rules. If a nursing home admits Medicaid-pending patients, and
their eligibility for Medicaid is subsequently denied, the home must
absorb their charges as bad debt or acquire payment from the patients.
Since these patients are poor, getting payment from them is a risk that
most homes are unwilling to take.
Many nursing home applicants can fall into this category because
hospital or nursing home admission may mark the first time in their
lives that they have needed Medicaid coverage. Since Medicare pays
most health care charges (except nursing home charges) that would
qualify an elderly person for Medicaid (Rice and Gabel 1986), the
Medicare hospital deductible may be the first occasion on which the
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poor or medically needy elderly person faces sufficiently large uncov-
ered medical care charges to merit seeking Medicaid coverage under
the so-called Medicaid "buy-in" provision. This provision permits
states to pay Medicare hospital deductibles and coinsurance through
their Medicaid programs on behalf of patients whose income qualifies
them for Medicaid. Four to six weeks typically pass, from application
to actual verification of eligibility by the county social services office,
which processes and confirms the financial eligibility of the applicant.
In the interim, such a patient faces some risk of being denied by
Medicaid for lack of information, unwillingness to liquidate an asset,
or other reasons. If the nursing home admits the patient during this
period of uncertainty, it may not be able to recoup its charges in the
event that the patient is ultimately denied Medicaid eligibility.
One recent study listed delays in processing Medicaid eligibility as
one of several barriers to timely hospital discharge (Barker, Williams,
Zimmer, et al. 1985).
Supply Factors
Many studies have examined the role of the supply of hospital, nursing
home, or community-based services in hospital discharge delays. Of
these, three explored the role of hospital occupancy. Markson, Steel,
and Kane (1983) found high occupancy rates to be associated with
discharge delays while the Office of the U.S. Inspector General (1980)
and Varricchio (1980) found the opposite.
High nursing home occupancy rates may be another contributing
factor (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980; Gruen-
berg and Willemain 1982). Additional indicators of "inadequate" nurs-
ing home supply - such as little turnover in skilled nursing facilities,
low ratio of skilled to acute beds (Varricchio 1980), shortage of beds
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1980; Massachu-
setts Hospital Association 1979; Sloane, Redding, and Wittlin 1981;
Rosenfeld, Goldman, and Kaprio 1957) and improper utilization of
available beds (Beattie and Jordan 1975)- also have been found to be
associated with discharge delays.
Shapiro, Roos, and Kavanaugh (1980) and Shapiro and Roos
(1981) found hospital discharge delays in Manitoba, Canada over a
five-year (1972-1976) period unchanged despite implementation of
several policies intended to alleviate them. Policies included increasing
the number of nursing home beds, rehabilitation beds, and home care
programs, and expanding the public insurance coverage of medical
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services to include these services. Despite these changes, hospital
lengths of stay increased, especially among the elderly.
Placement Coordinators' Perceptions
Discharge planners surveyed at 49 acute care hospitals in Boston,
Massachusetts frequently cited patient Medicaid eligibility determina-
tion, incontinence, inability to perform activities of daily living, and
mental confusion as reasons for placement delays (Markson, Steel, and
Kane 1983).
A utilization review nurse-coordinator concluded that the most
frequent reason for an unnecessary day among a sample of Medicare
or Medicaid admissions to a California hospital was the unavailability
of a skilled nursing facility (SNF) bed with the appropriate amount of
nursing services (Restuccia and Holloway 1976).
Toseland and Newman (1984) mailed questionnaires to 539 SNFs
in New York State. More than 91 percent of those responding (61
percent) reported area hospital-to-nursing home placement delays.
From 15 criteria, more than half of the respondents chose as their first
or second criterion for admitting a patient the amount of physical care
required. Another important factor was what bed was open, three-
fourths indicating that their facility had a policy of matching residents
living in the same room: an "applicant for a semi-private room may or
may not be admitted depending on who else is already residing in that
room" (Toseland and Newman 1984, 7). Also cited were "delays of
several months in receiving Medicaid approval," and lack of commu-
nity care alternatives.
Price
Given that the underlying model of nursing home use most frequently
applied to placement delay problems is an economic one, the role of
price would seem to be important. Yet few studies have included a
price variable. Scanlon (1980) used mean price charged private-pay
patients in his analysis of excess demand. Others have generally
ignored the variable despite Scanlon's view that it is the difference
between public and private payment rates that makes nursing homes
favor private patients.
Summary of Determinants
Table 1 summarizes factors found to be related to hospital discharge
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multivariate statistical controls, so few were able to determine the
separate contributions of the factors studied. Consequently, character-
istics such as "admitted from emergency room," "widowed or unmar-
ried," "long-term nursing home need," "old old," and many other traits
actually may not be associated with discharge and placement delays,
but rather may be correlated with other traits which are associated with
delays.
PILOT STUDY
Data were collected in a pilot study to permit validation of the role of
some of these findings in placement delays, especially those relating to
patient heavy-care requirements, Medicaid coverage, and admission
from a nursing home. The study also explored the impacts of "new"
variables, such as Medicaid-pending status, PPS, discharge to a
hospital-affiliated nursing home and, for Medicaid-eligible patients in
the sample, price.
STUDY DESIGN
Admissions to all three large general hospitals in the Charlotte area
were sampled. From admissions, the study sample included all elderly
patients discharged to nursing or rest homes, or who died awaiting
placement, during two six-month admission periods-one before and
one after implementation of Medicare's DRG-based PPS in each hospi-
tal. Since the implementation date of PPS varied by the hospitals' fiscal
year, sampling periods varied slightly by hospital. To control for sea-
sonality, the post-PPS sample was drawn from the six months corres-
ponding to the pre-PPS six-month period one year earlier. A 100
percent sample was used, since estimates suggested that such a large
sampling rate would be needed to produce sufficiently large subsam-
ples for subgroup analysis.
Sampling of admissions placed in nursing or rest homes drew
from the hospital's management information system, which was com-
puter assisted in two of the three hospitals, and which, in each case,
included a variable on discharge location. For patients who died await-
ing placement, hospital social workers' logs were the sampling frame,
since the management information systems made no mention of nurs-
ing homes for such patients.
More than 80 data items were drawn from the patients' hospital
records by a team of medical records technicians trained and super-
Hospital-to-Nursing Home Delays
vised by a nurse instructed in research methods. Data completeness
and quality checks were performed. Rater-specific validity checks were
made on ten items selected from as many domains, and an overall
validity check was conducted on a 20 percent reabstraction by the
nurse team leader.
Interviews were conducted with discharge planning staff at the
three hospitals, representatives of the state hospital and nursing home
associations, and admissions clerks at each nursing home in the area.
Interview data are not reported in this article, but were drawn upon in
interpreting the patient-record data.
Facility-specific Medicaid per diem reimbursement rates were
obtained from the state Medicaid agency for each nursing home to
whicth sampled Medicaid-eligible patients placed within the state were
discharged. Private-pay basic daily charges were obtained from pub-
lished licensure application data (North Carolina Department of
Human Resources 1986, 1985, 1984, 1983).
FINDINGS
Magnitude of the Problem
The dependent variable in the study was the number of "unnecessary
hospital days" defined as the days between the date on which the
physician ordered the patient medically ready for transfer to a nursing
or rest home and the date of actual transfer or death. The sample used
for analysis in this article was limited to patients who were placed alive
(944), since the stays of those who died awaiting placement, although
somewhat lengthy, were truncated by death.
Deaths Awaiting Placement. Seventy-two (7 percent) of the 1,016
discharges in the study sample died while awaiting placement. Most
died before they were medically ready for transfer, however. Only 24
experienced some unnecessary hospital stay. The average unnecessary
stay for these deceased patients ranged from 1 to 26 days, averaging
10.4 ( ± 7.1) days. Sensitivity analyses were conducted by including
those who died, and their inclusion did not affect the findings.
Live Placements. Sixty-four percent of nursing or rest home place-
ments experienced at least one unnecessary hospital day, accumulating
among them a total of about 3,500 unnecessary days in 12 months, at a
hospital semiprivate room-and-board cost that would have approxi-
mated half a million dollars paid had the beds been filled by other
patients -which would not always have happened. The average place-
ment delay lasted 5.9 ( ± 9.3) days for these patients.
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Lengths of delay ranged from 0 days to 66 days:







Computed for all placements (whether delayed or not), the average
delay lasted 3.7 days ( ± 7.9) of an average overall hospital stay of 15.2
days.
Deternminants of Placement Delays
Tables 2 and 3 present definitions, means, and standard deviations for
variables used in an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analysis
of unnecessary hospital days on a number of independent variables.
The model explained 26 percent of the variance in placement delays
(Table 4). Multicollinearity was assessed using a variety of standard
formal methods (following Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner 1985;
Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). None of the methods yielded results
that indicated the presence of multicollinearity.
Twelve variables were found to be statistically significant at the 5
percent significance level, and one at the 10 percent significance level
(using a two-tailed t-test). Among them, seven had positive coefficient
estimates, which means that the other six-with negative coefficient
estimates-were associated with shorter-than-average placement
delays. The six characteristics with positive coefficient estimates were
family involvement in the discharge, Medicaid, Medicaid-pending sta-
tus, mental disorder, surgery during the hospital stay, comatose or
semicomatose condition, and PPS.
Characteristics associated with shorter-than-average placement
delays were being female, being white, living alone, being admitted
from an institution, requiring intravenous feedings, and being dis-
charged to a hospital-affiliated facility.
Sex and Race. Patient demographic characteristics were related to
lengths of delay. Female patients stayed an average of about one and
one-half fewer unnecessary days than male patients. White patients
stayed about three fewer unnecessary days than nonwhite patients.
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Family involved in discharge plant
Usual living arrangement
Prior to hospital admission
Alone in communityt
In institutiont
With others in communityt



















Number of secondary diagnoses*




Age of patient (in years) at hospital admission




Patient lived in the hospital's county prior to
hospital admission
Patient married at hospital admission
Member(s) of patient's family involved in
patient discharge plan
Patient lived alone in the community
Patient lived in nursing home, rest home, or
other hospital
Patient lived with a relative, friend, or other
person(s) in the community
Medicaid
Patient or someone in her or his behalf had




Patient, family member, or other insurance
Patient's primary diagnosis
Number of patient's secondary diagnoses
Patient underwent surgical procedure(s)
during hospital stay






































Patient not oriented to person, place, or time
Patient abusive, destructive, agitated, or
wandering
Patient on a ventilator
Patient required turning and positioning
Patient had decubiti or other skin ulcers
Patient required sterile dressings
Patient had a tracheostomy
Patient required restraints
Patient comatose or semicomatose
Patient oxygen dependent
Patient required intravenous feedings
Patient required intramuscular injections
Patient on medication requiring close
monitoring
Patient required dialysis
Patient had physical or speech therapy
postdischarge order
Patient incontinent of bowel or bladder
Patient spoon fed by another person
Patient tube fed
Patient required minimal or no help from
another person with feeding
Patient discharged to a hospital-nursing home
facility closely affiliated with one of the
study hospitals
Patient's admitting hospital
Patient discharged from admitting hospital
after Medicare's DRG-based Prospective
Payment System was implemented
*Continuous variable.
tDichotomous variable. Characteristic described in the above table set to the value of
1. All others set equal to 0.
tReference (i.e., omitted) category.
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Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Independent
Variables (N = 808)
Standard





Resident of county 0.900 0.301
Social Support
Currently married 0.197 0.398
Family involved in discharge plan 0.578 0.494
Usual living arrangement
prior to hospital admission
Alone in community 0.149 0.356
In institution 0.582 0.494
Expected Payer Source
Medicaid 0.274 0.446
Medicaid pending 0.152 0.360
Medicare 0.128 0.334
Payer unknown 0.158 0.365




Genitourinary disease 0.055 0.227
Nervous system disease 0.041 0.198
Respiratory disease 0.097 0.296
Digestive system disease 0.106 0.309
Injury 0.157 0.364
Mental disorder 0.059 0.237
Other disease 0.131 0.338
Number of secondary diagnoses 3.340 2.138
Surgery during hospital stay 0.391 0.488
Hospitalized during year
prior to admission 0.477 0.500
Heavy-Care Conditions
Mentally disoriented 0.360 0.480
Behavior problem 0.204 0.403
Ventilator 0.004 0.061
Turning and positioning 0.505 0.500
Decubiti/Skin ulcers 0.168 0.374




Oxygen dependent 0.078 0.268
Continued
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Table 3: Continued
Standard
Independent Variables Mean Deviation
Intravenous feedings 0.120 0.325
Intramuscular injections 0.036 0.186
On medication requiring close
monitoring 0.279 0.449
Dialysis 0.005 0.070
Rehabilitation therapy 0.187 0.390
Incontinent of bowel or bladder 0.494 0.500
Help eating
Spoon fed 0.068 0.252
Tube fed 0.141 0.348
Hospital Characteristics
Discharged to hospital-affiliated





*Age is defined as the patient's age minus the mean age for the study sample.
Social Support. Two social support indicators- family involvement
in hospital discharge planning and living with another person in the
community prior to hospital admission -appeared to slow down nurs-
ing home placement. Patients whose families participated in their dis-
charge plan had an average of about a day-and-a-half longer
unnecessary hospital stay than those whose families did not. Those who
lived alone or in an institution prior to admission stayed an average of
about three fewer unnecessary days than those who lived with another
person in the community (F (2,759) = 9.27; p < .001).
Expected Payer Source. Expected source of payment for nursing
home care was significantly associated with number of unnecessary
days (F (4,759) = 11.09; p < .001). In particular, those who had
applied for Medicaid eligibility at the time of readiness for placement
but whose application had not yet been approved-the Medicaid-
pending group - stayed an average of over five more unnecessary days
than their private-pay counterparts. Medicaid-eligible patients also
experienced slightly longer delays than private-pay patients, averaging
about a day more.
Diagnosis and Other Heavy-Care Indicators. Patients in most of the
primary diagnosis groups were not any harder to place relative to their
reference group, patients with circulatory disease. Although the over-
all primary diagnosis variable was not significantly associated with
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Table 4: Unstandardized OLS Coefficients for Regression of
Unnecessary Hospital Days on Independent Variables (N= 808)
Unstandardized Standard
Variable Coefficient Error p-Level
Demographics
Age -0.019 0.037 .608
Female -1.466 0.611 .017*
White -3.276 0.830 .000*
Resident of county 0.626 0.849 .461
Social Support
Currently married 0.026 0.703 .971
Family involved in discharge plan 1.675 0.641 .009*
Usual living arrangement
prior to hospital admission -3.262 0.845 .000*
Alone in community -2.705 0.782 .001*
In institution
Expected Payer Source
Medicaid 1.325 0.746 .076t
Medicaid pending 5.115 0.829 .000*
Medicare -0.401 0.863 .642
Payer unknown 0.279 0.820 .734
Diagnoses and Related Conditions
Primary diagnosis
Neoplasms -1.176 1.122 .295
Endocrine/Metabolic -0.515 1.256 .682
Genitourinary disease -0.847 1.238 .494
Nervous system disease -2.988 1.363 .029*
Respiratory disease -0.886 0.959 .356
Digestive system disease -0.782 0.970 .421
Injury -1.182 0.906 .192
Mental disorder 2.835 1.188 .017*
Other disease -1.351 0.870 .121
Number of secondary diagnoses -0.190 0.121 .117
Surgery during hospital stay 2.051 0.604 .001*
Hospitalized during year
prior to admission -0.389 0.508 .443
Heavy-Care Conditions
Mentally disoriented -0.846 0.612 .167
Behavior problem 0.274 0.704 .698
Ventilator -1.023 4.393 .816
Turning and positioning -0.149 0.604 .805
Decubiti/Skin ulcers 0.374 0.725 .606
Sterile dressings 0.319 0.782 .684
Tracheostomy -2.519 4.352 .563
Restraints 0.393 0.711 .580
Comatose/Semicomatose 3.414 1.775 .055*
Continued
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Table 4: Continued
Unstandardized Standard
Variabk Coefficient, Error p-Level
Heavy-Care Conditions (continued)
Oxygen dependent -1.227 0.995 .218
Intravenous feedings -2.748 1.041 .008*
Intramuscular injections 1.044 1.365 .445
On medication requiring
close monitoring -0.165 0.573 .774
Dialysis -5.266 3.584 .142
Rehabilitation therapy -0.972 0.674 .150
Incontinent of bowel or bladder 0.147 0.564 .794
Help eating
Spoon fed 0.738 1.065 .488
Tube fed 1.443 1.026 .160
Hospital Characteristics
Discharged to hospital-
aff-iliated nursing home -2.610 0.867 .003*
Hospitall
1 -3.989 0.985 .000
2 -3.414 1.087 .002
Post-PPS, -4.156 1.010 .000
Hospital 1 x post-PPS$ 4.332 1.274 .001
Hospital 2 x post-PPS$ 4.980 1.361 .000




*Significant at the 5 percent significance level, using a two-tailed t-test.
t Significant at the 10 percent significance level, using a two-tailed t-test.
tThe effect of Medicare's DRG-based PPS on unnecessary hospital days varied by
hospital; the coefficients associated with the hospital, post-PPS, and interaction
variables should be interpreted with caution. Table 5 presents the hospital-specific
effects of PPS in a more interpretable form following Marsden (1982).
Table 5: Hospital-Specific Effects of Medicare's DRG-Based
PPS on Unnecessary Hospital Dayst
Effect of PPS Standard
Hospital on Unnecessary Hospital Days Error p-Level
1 0.176 0.768 .818
2 0.824 0.930 .376
3 -4.156 1.010 .oo0*
*Significant at the 5 percent level, using a two-tailed t-test.
t Hospital-specific effects were calculated following Marsden (1982).
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number of unnecessary days (F (9,759) = 1.85; p = .057), there
appeared to be good a priori reasons to explore the mental disorder
subgroup in particular, given the perceived importance of this variable
in the long-term care literature. i-Test results showed that patients with
a mental disorder were harder to place than those with circulatory
problems, averaging almost three more unnecessary days.
Few heavy-care indicators were significantly associated with
longer placement delays. Two exceptions were surgery during the hos-
pital stay (two extra days compared to nonsurgery patients) and being
comatose or semicomatose (three more days than other patients).
To test the possibility that multiple heavy-care traits might be
important, three separate regression analyses were conducted in which
the individual trait variables were replaced with alternative measures
of heavy care. The first, a cumulative count, included mental disorien-
tation, behavior problems, ventilator, turning and positioning,
decubiti/skin ulcers, sterile dressings, tracheostomy, restraints,
comatose/semicomatose, oxygen dependent, intravenous feedings, on
medications requiring close monitoring, dialysis, rehabilitation ther-
apy, incontinent of bowel or bladder, and spoon or tube feeding. The
average number of traits in this cumulative count was 3.05 (± 2.15).
The second analysis used the natural log of the count (x = 1.23 +
0.62). The third analysis used a binary variable indicating the presence
of more than four traits (x = 0.26 ± 0.44). In none of these analyses
was "cumulative" heavy care found to be significantly associated with
unnecessary days.
Heavy Care-Payer Source Interactions. Interactions between expected
payer source and each of the heavy-care variables and the indicators of
multiple heavy-care needs were tested and found to be nonsignificant.
Affiliated Facility. Patients discharged to a facility closely affiliated
with one of the study hospitals had about two and one-half fewer days
of unnecessary stay than those discharged elsewhere. The affiliated
facility was an acute care hospital with a large nursing home unit.
Medicare's PPS. The impact of Medicare's DRG-based PPS on
unnecessary days varied by hospital (F (2,759) = 7.92; p < .001).
Post-PPS placement delays from hospital number 3 were about four
days shorter than pre-PPS delays from the same hospital (Table 5).
Differences in average unnecessary stays pre- and post-PPS from the
other two hospitals were not statistically significant. For hospital 3,
unnecessary stays were reduced apparently as the reimbursement
incentives faced by the hospital changed. Differences in the hospitals'
responses to PPS may also reflect variation in their approach to and
effectiveness of utilization review. A rival explanation is a small
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increase in the area's nursing home bed supply. The change occurred
between hospital 3's pre- and post-PPS periods. Since pre- and post-
PPS periods for the three hospitals varied according to their fiscal
years, the bed-supply change occurred almost entirely during the other
two hospitals' pre-PPS implementation period and so could not have
confounded their PPS effects.
Deterrninants of Placement Delays
among Medicaid Patients
While the above analyses included patients of all payer sources, includ-
ing Medicaid, the role of Medicaid in placement delays was further
explored by a separate regression analysis on only Medicaid-eligible
patients placed in North Carolina nursing homes.
Price. A price variable was included along with most of the other
independent variables defined in Table 2. Payer source, of course, was
not included, and the indicators of multiple heavy-care conditions were
included instead of the individual traits in light of the smaller sample
(N = 185). Price was defined as the difference between the facility-
specific Medicaid per diem reimbursement rate and the private-pay
basic daily charge of the nursing home to which each patient was
discharged. From among a variety of private-pay charges used at each
home, the lowest price for the patient's level of care was chosen.
Patients whose level of care was unknown were assigned a price
weighted by the probability of their being at one level of care versus
another given their discharge to a particular home. Medicaid and
private-pay differences averaged $9.67 ( + 5.61), and ranged from $0
to $28.
Although delay was expected to increase with size of the price
difference, results (not shown in the tables) showed that price was not
significantly related when the effects of other factors were controlled
(p = .894, using a two-tailed t-test; b = -.015). Interaction effects of
price with heavy care were also examined, and were found to be statis-
tically nonsignificant.
Heavy Care. Given the statistical insignificance of the payer source-
heavy care interaction tests from the earlier analysis of all payers, it is
not surprising that results also showed that, with the exception of those
who had surgery during their hospital stay, heavy-care Medicaid
patients did not experience any more delay than their lighter-care
counterparts. Those who had surgery were delayed about three more
days than nonsurgery patients.
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Summary of Findings. In short, analysis of elderly hospital admis-
sions who were placed in nursing homes from the three study hospitals
(which represent 85 percent of the hospital beds and admit over 90
percent of all elderly hospital patients in the study county) showed that
about two-thirds of patients placed in nursing homes were delayed-
but that most delays were short.
Medicaid patients experienced slightly longer unnecessary stays,
and Medicaid-pending patients experienced considerably longer unneces-
sary stays than private-pay patients. Nonwhite patients and male
patients also experienced longer placement delays than other patients.
Family involvement in placement was associated with more unnecessary
days. With the exceptions of mental disorder, surgery during the hospi-
tal stay, and comatose or semicomatose condition, most patient heavy-
care characteristics were not associated with longer unnecessary stays.
Nor were multiple heavy-care needs associated with longer stays.
Shorter delays were associated with living alone in the community
or living in an institution prior to hospital admission, placement in an
affiliated facility, and placement after the implementation of PPS.
Some of these findings were expected given those of the earlier
studies summarized in Table 1. Other studies have found family
involvement to impede timely placement (Finger Lakes Health Sys-
tems Agency Back-Up Action Task Force 1982; Massachusetts Hospi-
tal Association 1979; Restuccia and Holloway 1976; Glass and Weiner
1976; Sloane, Redding, and Wittlin 1981; Toseland and Newman
1984). That Medicaid patients had slightly longer placement delays
than private-pay patients was not unexpected given Scanlon's (1980)
theory of the nursing home market and some of the findings reported
in Table 1, although a larger magnitude of effect had been expected.
Medicaid-pending status, which we found to be associated with rather
longer delays, had been mentioned as a potential factor by others
(Barker, Williams, Zimmer, et al. 1985; Massachusetts Hospital Asso-
ciation 1979; Glass and Weiner 1976; Markson, Steel, and Kane 1983;
Shapiro and Roos 1981), but was never tested.
The major surprise in terms of some previous findings was that so
few heavy-care requirements of the patient were associated with longer
delays. Numerous studies have mentioned a relationship between one
or more heavy-care traits and unnecessary hospital days. Some of these
traits include: mental or psychiatric disorder (Rosenfeld, Goldman,
and Kaprio 1957; Shapiro, Roos, and Kavanaugh 1980); disorienta-
tion (Glass, Mulvihill, Smith, et al. 1977; Glass and Weiner 1976;
Fields, MacKenzie, Charlson, and Sax 1986; Markson, Steel, and
Kane 1983); behavioral problems (Massachusetts Hospital Association
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1979; Meiners and Coffey 1985; Sloane, Redding, and Wittlin 1981);
dependency in activities of daily living (Gruenberg and Willemain
1982; Meiners and Coffey 1985; Markson, Steel, and Kane 1983);
heavy-care needs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
1980; Massachusetts Hospital Association 1979; Shapiro and Roos
1981); incontinence (Markson, Steel, and Kane 1983); multiple diag-
noses (Meiners and Coffey 1985); and multiple hospital procedures
(Meiners and Coffey 1985). With the exception of mental disorder,
surgery during the hospital stay, and being comatose or semicomatose,
these heavy-care characteristics did not appear, from our results, to
produce longer-than-average delays. Of course, Meiners and Coffey
(1985) were studying DRG overstay, not unnecessary days per se.
Also surprising was the lack of interaction effects between various
indicators of heavy care and expected payer sources. Except for those
who had surgery during their hospital stay, heavy-care Medicaid
patients experienced no more unnecessary days than light-care
Medicaid patients.
The negative effect of "being admitted from a nursing home" was
not particularly surprising. Although Gruenberg and Willemain
(1982) found the opposite, Meiners and Coffey's (1985) findings, along
with the findings of several other studies (Finger Lakes Health Systems
Agency Back-Up Action Task Force 1982; Barker, Williams, Zimmer,
et al. 1985) agree with ours. This is to be expected given that more
recent studies and ours are based on data collected after widespread use
of Medicaid bed hold-and-transfer agreements.
Three variables found to be significant in the negative direction
were unique to our study: being white, placement in a hospital-
affiliated facility, and DRG-based PPS implementation. That PPS
sped up placement is not surprising considering that it changed hospi-
tal discharge incentives. Nonwhites would be likely to experience
delays (as would males) if nursing homes were trying to match patients
in semiprivate rooms by sex or race- and survey results presented
earlier suggest that many nursing homes do have such policies (Shapiro
and Roos 1981). That some patients were able to shorten their place-
ment delay by spending it in an affiliated facility with nursing home
beds is not surprising.
Rejection of Rival Hypotheses
Systematic efforts were made to reject rival explanations for the find-
ings. One possible explanation might have been that heavy-care
patients did not experience more unnecessary days than light-care
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patients because they could be transferred to a hospital-and-nursing-
home facility closely affiliated with one of the hospitals in the study. To
examine this possibility, a separate regression analysis was conducted
on the discharges from the affiliated study hospital to identify determi-
nants of discharge to the affiliated facility. Results (not shown in the
tables) showed that placements with a few specific heavy-care traits
were among those more likely to go to the affiliated facility: having
surgery during hospital stay, requiring sterile dressings, or being com-
atose or semicomatose. However, heavy-care patients in general were
no more likely to go there than elsewhere. Of the 212 heaviest-care
patients in the study (those with more than four heavy-care condi-
tions), 25 percent went to the affiliated facility, while 75 percent went
to other long-term care facilities. Of those 101 heaviest-care patients
who were admitted to the hospitals from noninstitutional living
arrangements, over 60 percent went to other nursing homes. The three
patients with the most heavy-care conditions -10 and 11 heavy-care
conditions-also went to other nursing homes.
Another rival hypothesis would be one related to the bed supply. If
the study area were one with a higher-than-average nursing home bed-
to-elderly population ratio, it would be reasonable to conclude that
results would not generalize well to bed-shortage areas. This was not
the case, however. The bed supply-43 per 1,000 elderly -in the study
county (the same as that for the study state) was actually among the
tightest in the nation. Lower by 15 than the national median of 58, it
fell in the lowest quartile of bed supply reported for the 50 states by the
1982 National Master Facilities Inventory Survey (NMFI) (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 1985b). The nursing home
bed supply in the study county's eight-county health service area
(HSA) was also low at 37 per 1,000 elderly - the most restricted among
North Carolina's six HSAs.
Although the NMFI bed-to-population ratios do not include beds
in nursing home units of hospitals, when these beds (including those
affiliated with Veterans Administration hospitals) were taken into
account (American Hospital Association 1983), the study area's rela-
tive rankings remained low. However, to be sure that racial bias
(denial of beds to nonwhites) was not a part of the explanation for
apparent adequacy of supply to meet heavy-care patients' demand, we
adjusted the national bed-supply rates to compare beds available with
the number of white females age 65 and over. Again, the study area
ranked very low nationally.
An analysis of discharge location was conducted to determine
whether or not heavy-care patients were being sent to nursing homes
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out of the study county or the study county's HSA. Again, this proved
not to be the case. Of those 212 patients with more than four heavy-
care conditions, only about 9 percent were discharged to facilities out-
side the county-and few to facilities outside the HSA.
Finally, the average per diem reimbursement rates paid by the
Medicaid program for skilled and intermediate care in the study state
do not appear to provide an explanation. In 1982, the rates fell just
slightly above and below the respective mean rates for the nation (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 1985a), and incorporated
cost-center ceilings on patient care and other costs typical of most
Medicaid programs.
IMPLICATIONS
If these findings were to be replicated in other areas of the country with
similarly short nursing home bed supplies, it would be reasonable to
ask whether or not placement delays are a problem of large enough
magnitude to be tractable to cost-effective solutions. For example,
would it be difficult to recoup any sizable inve'stment in a case mix-
adjusted nursing home reimbursement system? With so few cases
delayed, and delays averaging such short duration, case-mix adjust-
ments would have to be very well defined and closely monitored to
avoid spending more on the solution than is now being spent on the
problem. Most popular case mix-adjusted systems now being used
appear to be paying admission bonuses on behalf of patients who, in
the tight-bedded study area, face little difficulty in finding a bed.
Findings from this pilot study indicate that even in a very tight bed-
supply area, Medicaid patients, compared to private-pay patients, had
some- but not much- difficulty finding a bed. While some heavy-care
patients face some delays, either the delays associated with a specific
condition are relatively short or the prevalence of the condition is very
low. Facilities for subacute levels of care, too, should they be created to
serve these few cases, would find few patients to fill their beds, at least
in the study area.
Replication of this study in other market areas, particularly in
New York and other areas with longstanding perceived placement
delay problems, is important. Scanlon's (1980) work showed that
Medicaid eligibility policy variation (which would affect demand) did
not affect total nursing home utilization (because when demand
expanded, it could not find a bed to make use of). But perhaps
expanded demand does affect placement delays. Likewise, it is possible
that high per capita incomes among the elderly in an area change the
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proportion of total beds available to public-pay patients, creating
longer placement delays. This possibility could be explored by replicat-
ing the present study in states with generous Medicaid eligibility poli-
cies, high per capita incomes, and low bed supplies.
It is also possible that patients who seek nursing home placements
from home rather than from hospitals experience longer delays when
hospital delays are as short as they were in the study area. Prior to the
dissemination of preliminary results of this pilot study, hospital place-
ment delays were regarded as a more serious problem in the study
county, whereas delays at home are now being cited as a problem,
possibly as a delayed result of PPS implementation. A companion
study of placement delays from home would be needed to know defini-
tively that timely access to nursing homes is not a problem for groups
other than those indicated here: the Medicaid-pending population,
those who have had surgery, the mentally ill, and nonwhites, among
others.
In any event, efforts to speed up the process of Medicaid eligibility
determination -or to mitigate its effects with presumptive screening or
some form of risk pooling that would protect nursing homes from
incurring financial loss on patients ultimately denied Medicaid -seem
warranted to encourage further shortening of placement delays.
Finally, it appears that during the study period nonwhite patients
and male patients systematically faced longer delays than other
patients, perhaps as a result of nursing home policies of matching
patients in semiprivate rooms on race or sex in combination with the
low prevalence of nonwhites and males in the homes. While nursing
homes may have accumulated experience that recommends such policy
to them, it would appear to violate the laws of North Carolina and the
United States relating to discrimination. Judging from results of the
survey of SNFs in New York cited above (Toseland and Newman 1984)
and findings of a report prepared for the Department of Health and
Human Services Office of Civil Rights (Institute of Medicine 1981),
such practices may not be limited to the South.
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